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Abstract
The multi-agent-systems paradigm is becoming more and more popular as a basis for realizing net-based solutions. This devel-
opment is accompanied by an increasing relevance of security issues. For instance, the potential loss of privacy and other assets is
a major concern for, both merchants and customers, in Internet-based commerce and, without being properly addressed, such very
legitimate concerns hamper the growth of e-commerce.
This article uses a comparison-shopping scenario to introduce a general methodology for formally verifying the security of
multi-agent systems. Following the approach of possibilistic information flow security, the flow of information between and within
agents is restricted in order to ensure that secrets will not be disclosed to unauthorized meddlers. The security requirements for the
overall system are then decomposed into requirements for the individual agents that can be verified independently from each other.
Exploiting the modular structure of a multi-agent system considerably reduces the complexity of the overall security analysis. The
techniques for decomposing security requirements, for verifying individual agents, and for deriving global security guarantees for
the entire system from locally verified properties are all generic in the sense that they apply also to many other systems and security
requirements than the ones that appear in the example scenario.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In parallel to the evolution of computer architectures from main frames over client-server architectures to open
system architectures, we observe an evolution in programming methodologies from structured programming over
object-oriented programming to agent-oriented programming. The development of new capabilities and new para-
digms for computing and for communicating is accompanied by an evolution of threats to our information systems
and this creates an increasing demand for, and also on, security mechanisms. In early computing systems, physical
controls were a sufficiently effective means for protecting data and software from unauthorized access because these
systems could be physically isolated. Multiuser-programming created a need for mechanisms to logically control the
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systems exacerbated these problems, providing not only remote access for users and programs, but also creating pos-
sibilities for attacks from anywhere in the world. At this point in time, it seems that the development of computing
and communication features has outpaced the ability to secure their manifold applications in information systems. Re-
quirements for confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and access control have become more differentiated,
but the ability to meet these requirements apparently has not kept up.
In particular, the growth of Internet-based commerce is hampered by legitimate concerns over the security of
the information systems involved. One of the major concerns for both merchants and customers participating in e-
commerce is the potential for loss of privacy and other assets due to breaches in the security of corporate computer
systems. Confidentiality and integrity of data is endangered by malicious users and programs trying to extract or
to manipulate critical information. Securing a multi-agent-based e-commerce system involves several, orthogonal
aspects: Open communication lines must be protected against eavesdropping and the unauthorized modification of
messages by applying cryptographic algorithms and security protocols. The access to data and other resources must
be restricted to authorized users and agents. Finally, one must control the propagation of critical information after it
has been legitimately accessed by an agent. The latter aspect is the focus of this article, i.e., we demonstrate how to
ensure secure information flow inside an agent program and, on a larger scale, inside an agent society.
Starting with Goguen and Meseguer’s work on noninterference [8,9], restrictions on the flow of information have
been formalized as independence properties between actions and observations. For deterministic systems, an agent A
is noninterfering with an agent B if B’s observations are independent of A’s actions. In other words, no matter which
actions A chooses, he cannot cause the observations of B to change and, hence, there is no danger that A might leak
any secrets to B . For non-deterministic systems, the intuition works backwards: A is possibilistically non-interfering
with B if the observations of B can be explained by so many different behaviors of A that B’s observations do not
reveal which actions A has chosen. Based on this intuition, a variety of possibilistic information flow properties has
been proposed that can be used for formalizing security requirements (see, for example, [4,6,10,18,23,25,34,42,45,
47]). For many of these properties, compositionality results have been derived that allow one to conclude the security
of a composed system in a bottom-up fashion from the security of the system’s components. When analyzing the
security of information systems in a top-down fashion, an additional step is needed. One needs to identify local
security requirements for the individual components such that, after a successful completion of the local analysis of
each component, a compositionality result can be applied to derive the desired global guarantee. This is the problem
that we address in this article.
The first main contribution of this article is a methodology for decomposing security requirements for a multi-agent
system into local security requirements for the individual agents. Given a set of secrets, we categorize each agent as
being either a friend or an observer. The intuition is that only friends may obtain information about the secrets and
that all attackers in a given scenario have to belong to the observer category. The objective of this decomposition step
is to split off a subsystem, i.e., the system of observers, for which the security analysis is straightforward—given that
none of the friends leaks secret information to the observers. For decomposing the security requirement for the friend
subsystem in a second step, we label each action with confidential, public, or ‘don’t care’. All actions that directly
depend on the given secrets must be labeled confidential, all actions for interacting with the observer subsystem must
be labeled public, and the labeling of the remaining actions can be freely chosen. This allows us to reduce the problem
of decomposing the security requirement for the entire friend subsystem to the problem of finding an appropriate local
labeling for each friend. In the local analysis of a friend, it remains to prove that occurrences of public actions do
not depend on prior occurrences of confidential actions. At both decomposition steps, our methodology ensures that,
after a successful analysis of the subsystems, a compositionality result can be applied to conclude the desired security
guarantee for the composed system.
Our second main contribution, is a case study in which we illustrate the entire process of formally defining and
analyzing the security of a multi-agent system that realizes a virtual mall. In the virtual mall, customers and merchants
are represented by agents that operate on their behalf. Customers provide their agents with a description of the desired
goods and a list of attributes for evaluating and comparing the offers that they receive from the merchants’ agents.
Customer agents may start a negotiation with the merchant agents and eventually either report a list of offers, ordered
by the attributes, together with the corresponding addresses to their owners or buy the goods directly. Manifold security
requirements arise in such a scenario. For instance, customers would like to keep confidential the maximum price that
they are willing to pay for given goods because knowledge of this information could be exploited by merchants during
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which they are willing to sell. It’s also in the merchants’ interest, for instance, that customers cannot deny having
made the buy requests that the merchants receive, i.e., the non-repudiability of buy requests, while customers want to
be sure that buy request in their name cannot be faked by others. An owner of a virtual mall, for example, wants to
ensure that the trading environment is fair in a sense that is attractive to, both customers and merchants.
In our case study, we select one security requirement as a running example and demonstrate how it can be for-
malized with a possibilistic security property. We then apply our decomposition methodology to reduce the security
requirement for the entire virtual mall in two steps to a set of local requirements for the individual agents, i.e., the
friends. To simplify the verification of the resulting local security requirements, we apply the so called unwinding
technique. After the successful completion of the local analysis, we apply a compositionality result (whose applica-
bility is ensured by our decomposition methodology) to prove that the entire multi-agent system satisfies the given
global security requirement.
We use the Modular Assembly Kit for Security Properties (brief: MAKS), a framework for possibilistic information
flow security previously proposed by one of the authors [18,22], as the formal basis of our investigations. Using the
MAKS allows us to simplify the analysis by re-using compositionality results [21] and unwinding theorems [19] that
were previously derived in this framework. Moreover, the so called concept of views in the MAKS provides the basis
for the labeling of actions in the second step of our decomposition methodology. We suspect that our decomposition
methodology could be adopted also to other frameworks for possibilistic information flow security (such as, for
instance, [6,25,34,47]), but this is beyond the scope of the current article.
We start our investigations in Section 2 with the modeling of multi-agent systems consisting of various agents
and a common platform with state-event systems. Section 3 gives an introduction to the framework of possibilistic
information flow security and illustrates how we formalize security requirements of multi-agent systems within this
framework. Section 4 introduces techniques for decomposing these global security requirements to local requirements
on individual agents. Formal verification techniques for establishing these local requirements are presented and illus-
trated in Section 5. We put our approach into perspective with related work in Section 6. Section 7 summarizes our
main findings and gives an outlook on some research questions for the future.
2. Functional agent modeling
We demonstrate the process of defining and analyzing the security requirements of multi-agent systems in a
comparison-shopping scenario. More specifically, we consider trading in a virtual mall that is realized by a multi-
agent system. Suppose a customer would like to find an offer for specific goods like, for instance, some software
program or some book, at the cheapest available price or at the shortest available time of delivery. This customer
could make use of the mall in the following way:
(1) The customer dispatches an agent with a description of the desired product and the attributes according to which
different offers shall be compared.
(2) The customer agent contacts a matchmaker to obtain information about merchants in the virtual mall. Merchants
in the virtual mall are also represented by agents that are appropriately instantiated and the matchmaker is a
service agent that simplifies searching for the relevant merchants.
(3) The customer agent contacts the agents of all merchants advertised by the matchmaker and inquires about the
desired product. The merchant agents may submit an offer in return, specifying price, delivery costs, delivery
time etc.
(4) Based on the replies by the merchant agents, the customer agent either reports its findings ranked according to the
given preferences (e.g. a sorted list of offers with the addresses of the corresponding merchants) to its owner or it
buys the goods directly from the merchant who made the best offer.
In order to formally analyze the security requirements in a virtual mall, we need a concrete formal specification
of an example system. We specify each agent by a component specification and the entire mall as the composition
of these components in order to reflect the modular architecture of a multi-agent system. We instantiate a generic
interface specification of agents with the behavior specific to customer agents and merchant agents, respectively. For
simplicity, we abstract from the matchmaker and other services that the virtual mall might offer. Our focus is on the
306 D. Hutter et al. / Journal of Applied Logic 5 (2007) 303–332trading between customer agents and merchant agents, and, for brevity, we refer to customer agents and merchant
agents, respectively, also by customer and merchant in the following. We specify the communication between the
various agents in a designated component specification, the platform. As this component shall capture all aspects of
communication between the agents, we have to demand that communication between agents can only occur via the
platform. There are manifold ways to realize the platform in an implementation. For instance, if communication is
implemented using operating-system-level channels (like, e.g., pipes in UNIX) then this part of the operating system
corresponds to our platform specification. If communication is implemented using communication protocols then the
implementation of sockets and of the relevant part of the TCP/IP stack corresponds to the platform. A realization of
the platform could also include other parts of the run-time environment (like, e.g., a Java platform) or application-level
components.
In our functional specification of the virtual mall, we strive for simplicity while capturing the essential aspects
of such a system. For instance, we abstract from the implementation details of a platform and disregard aspects of
belief and intention that trigger an agent’s behavior. Our case study is meant as a template for the security analysis of
multi-agent-based virtual malls and other multi-agent systems. For analyzing the security of a real system, one would
have to refine the functional specification accordingly. Refining the functional specification might invalidate some
analysis results, which makes it necessary to re-do those parts of the analysis that are affected by the refinement. In
the following we separate those parts of the analysis that are specific to the chosen scenario of comparison shopping
from the more general parts that might be also applicable to other multi-agent systems. To this end, we precede the
numbers of definitions and lemmata that are specific to the comparison-shopping scenario with ‘Ex’. These parts of
the analysis would have to be re-done after a refinement.
2.1. System model and specification language
We use an event-based model for capturing the interface and the behavior of the individual agents, the platform,
and the entire virtual mall. As usual, events correspond to actions that cause a transition from one system state to
another.
Definition 1 (State-event system). A state-event system SES = (E, I,O,S, s0, T ) is a tuple, where E is the set of
events, I ⊆ E and O ⊆ E are the sets of input events and output events, respectively, S is the set of states, s0 ∈ S is
the initial state, and T ⊆ S ×E × S is the transition relation. We require I and O to be disjoint and T to be the graph
of a partial function from S ×E to S.
A state-event system is deterministic in the sense that the transition relation T is a partial function S × E → S.
That is, for a given state s and a given event e, there is at most one successor state s′. Nevertheless, it is possible to
capture nondeterministic system behavior with state-event systems as different events may be enabled in a given state
s and their occurrence may result in different successor states. For instance, the random selection of messages from
an input buffer by an agent could be captured by modeling the selection of different messages with different events
(e.g., by using selecta(i) for modeling the selection of the ith message by agent a).
A run of a given system is modeled by a trace, i.e., a sequence of events. As a convention, we use 〈〉 to denote the
empty trace, use the operator 〈·〉 to convert events into traces (i.e., 〈e〉 is the trace consisting of a single occurrence of
the event e), and use a dot to denote concatenation of traces (i.e., t.t ′ is the trace resulting from the concatenation of
the trace t with the trace t ′).
Definition 2 (Reachable, enabled, possible trace). Let SES = (E, I,O,S, s0, T ) be a state-event system. The relation
t	⇒T ⊆ S × S is inductively defined by
s
t	⇒T s, if t = 〈〉,
s
〈e〉.t	⇒T s′, if and only if ∃s′′ ∈ S.T (s, e, s′′)∧ s′′ t	⇒T s′.
A state s ∈ S is reachable in SES, denoted by reachable(SES, s), if and only if there is a trace t ∈ E∗ such that
s0
t	⇒T s. A trace t ∈ E∗ is enabled in a state s ∈ S, denoted by enabled(SES, s, t), if and only if there is a state
s′ ∈ S such that s t	⇒T s′ holds. A trace t ∈ E∗ is a possible trace if and only if t is enabled in s0.
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from a set of program variables to a set of values. We use s(v) for denoting the value of the variable v in the state s.
If variables can take values from infinite datatypes then a system can, in principle, consist of infinitely many states.
For a finite representation of the transition relation of a program, we employ pre-/post-condition statements (brief:
PP-statements) [29]. This is a simple formalism for specifying a transition relation by defining pre-conditions and
post-conditions for the individual events. A PP-statement has the following form:
estat;affects : vi1, . . . , vin
Pre : Φ(v1, . . . , vn)
Post : Ψ (v1, . . . , vn, v′1 . . . , v′n).
In the above PP-statement, vi1, . . . , vin denotes the list of variables whose values might change when the event estat
occurs. The values of all other variables remain unchanged. The formulas Φ and Ψ express, respectively, the pre-
condition and post-condition of estat. In these formulas, we use the names of the variables v1, . . . , vn to denote their
value in the state before the transition. For denoting the values of variables in the state after the transition, we decorate
the names of variables with primes. That is, vi denotes the value of variable vi in the state before the transition caused
by estat and v′i denotes the value of variable vi in the state after the transition. A PP-statement only imposes constraints
on occurrences of a single event (e.g., the above PP-statement only imposes constraints on occurrences of estat). For
defining a complete transition relation, one specifies a set of PP-statements.
The formalism of PP-statements has a logical characterization. Semantically, the above PP-statement denotes the
following set of state transitions:
{(s, e, s′) ∈ S ×E × S|estat = e →
[Φ(s(v1), . . . , s(vn))
∧Ψ (s(v1), . . . , s(vn), s′(v1), . . . , s′(vn))
∧ ∀v /∈ {vi1, . . . , vin}.s(v) = s′(v)]}.
This logical characterization reveals that the above PP-statement permits a transition (s, estat, s′) if and only if the
pre-condition Φ holds for the state s, the post-condition Ψ holds for the pair s, s′ of states, and the values of all
variables not mentioned in vi1, . . . , vin remain unchanged by the transition. The condition estat = e ensures that the
PP-statement, indeed, does not impose any constraints on events other than estat. The transition relation modeled by a
set of PP-statements is the intersection of the transition relations modeled by the individual PP-statements.
We used PP-statements already in previous case studies on information flow security and developed basic tool
support for simplifying their use in the context of the Verification Support Environment (brief: VSE), an industrial-
strength, general-purpose tool for supporting the use of formal methods in large-scale software development [1]. The
reader is referred to [30] for a detailed description of how PP-statements are translated into the VSE-SL, the formal
specification language of the VSE. While we found it convenient to use PP-statements in our case study, one could use
any other specification formalism for specifying labeled transition relations, including process algebras like CSP [13]
or CCS [27]. The choice of a specification formalism is only relevant for the functional specification of the various
agents and the platform. From Section 3 on, we only refer to the state-event system that is induced by the logical
characterization of PP-statements.
2.2. Specification of the agents
As mentioned before, we consider two kinds of agents, namely customer agents and merchant agents, in our case
study. In the specification of agents, we distinguish between generic aspects that are common to all kinds of agents
and agent-specific aspects. The benefit of this distinction is that large parts of our analysis only depend on the generic
aspects and, hence, remain valid if one were exchanging agent-specific aspects. An example for a generic aspect is that
agents have to be initialized before they start to operate in the virtual mall. We use a variable Run to distinguish these
two phases of an agent’s behavior where an agent is still in the initialization phase if Run is false (⊥) and, if Run is true
(), the initialization has been completed and the agent is operating in the virtual mall to fulfill its designated purpose.
For modeling the control flow in an agent, we use a variable pc that points to a location in the agent’s program, the
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particular program that the agent is executing and the concrete set of program variables, however, are not generic as
they depend on the particular kind of agent.
There are also generic aspects in the behavior of agents. We use the event inita(Mem) for modeling the initialization
of program variables in agent a with a function Mem. The completion of the initialization phase for agent a is modeled
by the event starta . This event sets the variable Run to true and, afterwards, the agent starts to execute its program.
The stepwise execution of the agent’s program is modeled by several further events, but these events depend on the
particular kind of agent. Common to all kinds of agents is that they exchange messages with other agents (via the
platform). We use events of the form senda(b,m) to model that an agent a sends a message m to the platform with
the intention that the platform forwards the message to the agent b. Events of the form recvb(a,m) are used to model
that agent b receives a message m (originally sent by agent a) from the platform.
More formally, we obtain the following generic specification of agents.
Definition 3 (Agent-SES). Let A be a set of names for agents and M be a set of messages. A state-event system
SESa = (Ea, Ia,Oa,Sa, s0a , Ta) is an agent state-event system (brief: Agent-SES) for an agent a ∈ A with a set of
internal events Inta and a set of program variables PV iff
Ea = Ia ∪Oa ∪ Inta,
Ia ⊆ {inita(Mem) | Mem : PV → Val} ∪ {starta} ∪ {recva(b,m) | b ∈A \ {a},m ∈M},
Oa ⊆ {senda(b,m) | b ∈A \ {a},m ∈M},
S = {(Run,pc,mem) | Run ∈ Bool,pc ∈ Nat,mem : PV → Val},
s0a = (⊥,0,mem0) for some mapping mem0: PV → Val.
The specification of a concrete agent can be obtained by instantiating the generic specification. To this end, one
needs to define two actual parameters, i.e., a set of program variables and a set of internal events. This is the approach
that we use for specifying customer agents and merchant agents in the following.
Note that the generic specification in Definition 3 leaves the transition relation (i.e., T ) and the internal aspects
of an agent specification (i.e., the local state and the set of internal actions) underspecified. The interface of an agent
specification is partially given by constraining the set I to events of the form init, start, and recv events and by
constraining the set O to send events.
In Section 4, we decompose a security requirement on the level of generic agent specifications. The internal details
of a given agent are only relevant in Section 5 when we analyze the local security requirements resulting for this agent.
2.2.1. Comparison-shopping scenario: specification of customer agents
After a customer agent has received the set of relevant merchants, it contacts these merchants and awaits their
offers. Eventually, the customer agent selects, based on the preferences of the agent’s owner, one of these offers and
buys the goods.
In our specification, we assume that the agent’s owner supplies his preferences to the agent during the initialization
phase. The variable Preferences is used for storing these preferences. Moreover, we assume that a customer agent is
initialized with the set of relevant merchants. This set is stored in the variables RMers and OMers. The remaining
program variables are CurMer, Offers, and BestOffer. These variables are used, respectively, for iterating over a set
of merchants, for storing the offers received so far, and for storing the offer that has been selected by the agent.
The interface events of a customer agent ca are initca(Mem), startca, sendca(b,m), and recvca(b,m) as specified in
Definition 3. For modeling the internal actions, we use events of the form intca(l, l′,Mem) where l and l′ are pointers
into the agent’s program (representing the value of the program counter before and after the transition, respectively)
and Mem is a mapping from program variables to values (representing the values of program variables before the
transition).
After being initialized by the events initca(Mem) and startca, the customer agent ca sends a request to each merchant
in the set RMers. This first phase is modeled by three steps (1  pc  3): selecting a merchant agent, removing
this agent from RMers, and sending the actual request. In a second phase (pc = 4), incoming offers are stored in
the variable Offers and the variable OMers is updated for keeping track which relevant merchant agents have not
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yet submitted an offer. After a timeout, the best offer (according to Preferences) is stored in the variable BestOffer
(pc = 6/7) and, in a final phase, a buy request is sent to the merchant who submitted this best offer. The control flow
for a customer agent is summarized in Fig. 1.
More formally, we obtain the following specification of a customer agent. Here, and in the following, we use nil to
denote the empty set and ⊥ for undefined values.
Definition Ex-1 (Specification of a customer agent). Let Ac be a set of names for customer agents and pref ca denote
the initial preferences of the customer ca ∈Ac. An agent state-event system SESca = (Eca, Ica,Oca, Sca, s0ca, Tca) for
the agent ca with a set of internal events Intca and a set of program variables PVca is a customer state-event system iff
• PVca = {RMers,OMers,CurMer,Offers,BestOffer,Preferences},
• mem0(RMers) = nil = mem0(OMers),
• mem0(CurMer) = ⊥ = mem0(BestOffer),
• mem0(Preferences) = pref ca, and
• Intca and Tca are given by the PP-Statements in Fig. 2.
Definition Ex-1 is meant as an example for the specification of a customer agent. We need such a concrete spec-
ification in order to illustrate the local security analysis for the individual agents in Section 5. As mentioned before,
one could refine the specification of customer agents when analyzing a real system. In particular, the buying behav-
ior could be refined according to a well-known model like, for example, the Nicosia model [32], the Howard–Shet
model [15], the Engel–Kollat–Blackwell (EKB) model [5], or the Consumer Decision Process Model (CDP) [3]. Our
exemplary security analysis of a customer agent could then serve as a guideline for re-doing the local analysis for the
refined agent specification.
2.2.2. Comparison-shopping scenario: specification of merchant agents
When a merchant dispatches an agent, he provides his agent with information about the goods to be sold. This
would include a description of the goods themselves as well as information about available quantities and prices.
In the virtual mall, a merchant agent awaits requests from customers and, if appropriate, replies with offers for the
requested goods. A merchant agent also collects the orders for goods that it receives from customers in response to
previously sent offers. This set can be used by the merchant agent’s owner to deliver the goods as ordered.
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Ica = {initca(Mem), startca, recvca(b,m) | Mem : PV → Val, b ∈Am,m ∈M}
Oca = {sendca(b,m) | b ∈Am,m ∈M}
initca(Mem);affects: mem,pc
Pre: Run = ⊥,pc = 0,
Mem : PV → Val
Post: pc′ = 1,mem′ = initvals,
mem′(RMers) = mem′(OMers),
mem′(Offers) = nil
startca;affects: Run
Pre: pc = 1,Run = ⊥
Post: Run′ = 
intca(1,2,Mem);affects: mem(CurMer),pc
Pre: Run = ,pc = 1,mem = Mem,mem(RMers) = nil
Post: pc′ = 2,
mem′(CurMer) = select(mem(RMers))
intca(2,3,Mem);affects: mem(RMers),pc
Pre: Run = ,pc = 2,mem = Mem,
mem(CurMer) ∈ mem(RMers)
Post: pc′ = 3,mem′(RMers) =
mem(RMers) \ mem(CurMer)
sendca(ma,offer_request(p));affects: pc
Pre: Run = ,pc = 3,ma = mem(CurMer),
p = mem(Preferences)
Post: pc′ = 1
intca(1,4,Mem);affects: pc
Pre: Run = ,pc = 1,
mem = Mem,mem(RMers) = nil
Post: pc′ = 4
recvca(ma, o);affects: mem(Offers),mem(OMers),pc
Pre: Run = ,pc = 4,ma ∈ OMers, o ∈ Offers
Post: mem′(Offers) = {[ma, o]} ∪ mem(Offers),
mem′(OMers) = mem(OMers) \ {ma},
pc′ = 4
intca(4,5,Mem);affects: pc
Pre: Run = ,pc = 4,mem = Mem
Post: pc′ = 5
intca(5,6,Mem);affects: mem(BestOffer),pc
Pre: pc = 5,mem = Mem,mem(Offers) = nil
Post: pc′ = 6,
mem′(BestOffer) =
min(mem(Offers),mem(Preferences))
sendca(ma,buy(o));affects: pc
Pre: pc = 6,mem(BestOffer) = [ma, o]
Post: pc = 7
Fig. 2. Formal specification of a customer agent with PP-statements.
The variable Catalog is used to store the information about the goods that the merchant agent should sell for its
owner. The program variables Requests, Offers, and Contracts are used to store, respectively, the requests received
from customers that have not yet been answered, the set of offers made, and the orders received.
The interface events of a merchant agent are initma(Mem), startma, sendma(b,m), and recvma(b,m) as specified in
Definition 3. Like for customer agents, we use events of the form intma(l, l′,Mem) for modeling the internal actions.
After being initialized by the events initma(Mem) and startma, a merchant agent awaits requests from the customer
agents. The merchant agent stores each request that it receives in the set Requests. Once, Requests is non-empty, the
merchant agent may decide to send an offer in response. The offer is generated based on the given request and the
information in Catalog. All offers made are recorded in Offers. Once Offers is non-empty, the merchant agent also
accepts orders that correspond to one of the offers in Offers. After such a buy request has been received, the offer is
removed from Offers and the order is stored in Contracts. Fig. 3 summarizes the control flow in a merchant agent.
More formally, we obtain the following specification of a merchant agent:
Definition Ex-2 (Specification of a merchant agent). Let Am be a set of names for merchant agents. An agent state-
event system SESma = (Ema, Ima,Oma, Sma, s0ma, Tma) for an agent ma ∈Am with a set of internal events Intma and a
set of local variables PVma is a merchant state-event system iff
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Intma = ∅
Ima = {initma(Mem), startma, recvma(b,m) | Mem : PV → Val, b ∈Ac,m ∈M}
Oma = {sendma(b,m) | b ∈Ac,m ∈M}
startma;affects: Run
Pre: Run = ⊥,pc = 1
Post: Run′ = 
initma(initvals);affects: mem,pc
Pre: Run = ⊥,pc = 0
Post: pc′ = 1,mem′ = initvals,
mem′(Requests) = nil
mem′(Offers) = nil
mem′(Contracts) = nil
recvma(ca,offer_request(p));affects: mem(Requests)
Pre: Run = ,pc = 1, ca ∈Ac
Post: mem′(Requests) = {[ca,p]} ∪ mem(Requests)
sendma(ca,o);affects: mem(Requests),mem(Offers)
Pre: Run = ,pc = 1,
(ca,p) ∈ mem(Requests),
o = gen_offer(ca,p,mem(Catalog))
Post: mem′(Requests) = mem(Requests) \ (ca,p),
mem′(Offers) = {[ca,o]} ∪ mem(Offers)
recvma(ca,buy(o));affects: mem(Contracts),mem(Offers)
Pre: Run = ,pc = 1, [ca,o] ∈ mem(Offers)
Post: mem′(Contracts) = {[ca,o]} ∪ mem(Contracts),
mem′(Offers) = mem(Offers) \ [ca,o]
Fig. 4. Formal specification of a merchant agent with PP-statements.
• PVma = {Catalog,Requests,Contracts,Offers},
• mem0(Catalog) = mem0(Requests) = mem0(Contracts) = mem0(Offers) = nil, and
• Intma and Tma are given by the PP-Statements in Fig. 4.
Like for customer agents, Definition Ex-2 is meant as an example for the specification of a merchant agent that
could be refined when analyzing a real system.
2.3. Specification of the communication platform
The communication between agents is formalized in a separate component of our specification. The platform
buffers any messages that are sent and eventually forwards these messages to the agents that are the intended recipients.
There is a separate message buffer buf b for each agent b and the state of the platform is characterized by the contents
of these buffers. We use events of the form senda(b,m) to model that an agent a sends a message m to the platform
which should forward the message to the intended recipient, agent b. When senda(b,m) occurs, a message m is
added to buf b , the message buffer for agent b. Events of the form recvb(a,m) are used to model that the message m
(originally sent by a) is forwarded to agent b. Afterwards the message is erased from the buffer. The asynchronous
communication between agents prevents senders from being blocked. Note also that send-events are input events for
the platform (while being output events for agents) and recv-events are output events of the platform (while being
input-events for agents).
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Pre: true
Post: buf ′b = {[a, b,m]}uniondbl buf b
recva(b,m);affects: buf a
Pre: [b, a,m] ∈ buf a
Post: buf ′a = buf a\\ {[b, a,m]}
Fig. 5. PP-statements of the platform.
Our specification assumes the communication via the platform to be reliable in the sense that no messages are lost
or filtered and that no spurious messages appear.
Definition 4 (Platform specification). Let A=Ac ∪Am be a set of names for agents and M be the set of messages.
A state-event system SESP = (EP , IP ,OP ,SP , s0P ,TP ) is a platform state-event system for A iff
EP = IP ∪OP ,
IP = {senda(b,m) | a, b ∈A, a = b,m ∈M},
OP = {recva(b,m) | a, b ∈A, a = b,m ∈M},
SP = NM × · · · × NM with |SP | = |A|,
s0P = (∅, . . . ,∅)
with ∅ denoting the empty multi-set. Elements of SP are tuples consisting of the buffers for the individual agents in
A such that there is a one-to-one relation between an intended buffer in SP and an agent in A. TP is defined by the
PP-statements in Fig. 5 with respect to the state variables buf a1 , . . . ,buf an .
We model the buffers of the agents as multi-sets of messages. This allows an agent to download messages in
any arbitrary order. Thus, in the PP-statements of Fig. 5 uniondbl denotes the union on multi-set and \\ the subtraction on
multi-sets.
Definition 4 is meant as an example for the specification of a communication platform. One could refine this
specification, for instance, to model a Java platform running on a single machine or an implementation of the JACK
system [43] distributed on multiple machines.
2.4. Specification of the multi-agent systems
Before moving to the next level of complexity in our specification, namely the specification of the entire multi-
agent system, we simplify the specification of individual agents by abstracting from the internal states of these agents.
This results in a specification of agents in terms of their possible traces. The resulting trace-based specifications fit
nicely with the system models that are often assumed in the definition of information flow properties (see, for example,
[10,18,23]). This facilitates the specification of security requirements in later sections.
Definition 5 (Event system). An event system ES = (E, I,O,Tr) consists of a set E of events, a set of input events
I ⊆ E, a set of output events O ⊆ E and a set of all possible traces Tr ⊆ E∗ of ES. We require I and O to be disjoint
and Tr to be closed under prefixes, i.e., α.β ∈ Tr implies α ∈ Tr.
There is a canonical abstraction from the internal states in state-event systems, i.e., each state-event system induces
a unique event system.
Definition 6 (Event system induced by a state-event system). A state-event system SES = (E, I,O,S, s0, T ) induces
an event system ESSES = (E, I,O,TrSES) where TrSES is defined by TrSES = {τ | enabled(SES, s0, τ )}.
More complex systems can be specified by composing the specifications of their components. In our case study, we
exploit this possibility by specifying the entire virtual mall as a composition of the various agents and the platform.
The notion of composition for event systems was introduced by McCullough [23] and is similar to the one in process
algebras like CSP [13]. Technically, the composed system can engage in any event in which one of its components
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send-events of the agents are identified with the corresponding send-events of the platform. The components of the
composed system interact with each other by synchronizing on the occurrences of shared events. This means, the
projection of a trace of the overall system to the set of events of any component must be a possible trace of that
component. The projection of a trace τ to a given set of events (denoted by τ |E) results from τ by deleting all events
not in E.
Definition 7 (Composition). Two event systems ES1 = (E1, I1,O1,Tr1) and ES2 = (E2, I2,O2,Tr2) are composable
iff each communication event is an input event of one component and an output event of the other component, i.e.,
E1 ∩E2 ⊆ (O1 ∩ I2)∪ (O2 ∩ I1). The composition ES1 ‖ ES2 is then defined as (E, I,O,Tr) where
E = E1 ∪E2, Tr = {τ ∈ E∗ | τ |E1 ∈ Tr1, τ |E2 ∈ Tr2},
I = (I1 \O2)∪ (I2 \O1), O = (O1 \ I2)∪ (O2 \ I1).
We are now in the position to specify the entire virtual mall as the composition of the respective specifications
of customer agents, merchant agents, and the platform. We usually index a composed event system by the set of its
agents. If the composed event system includes the platform we add the symbol “+” to the index.
By definition our agents only communicate via the platform. They do not share any events, and, therefore, agents
specifications are trivially composable. For a given set X ⊆A of agent names, the result of the composition ‖x∈X ESx
is an event system having the send-events of all agents x ∈ X as output-events. The recv-events, the initialization
events, and the start events of all agents form the input events of this composition. The agents and the platform share
only send and recv events. Thus, we define:
Definition 8 (Multi-agent system as ES). Let X ⊆A be a non-empty set of agents and let ESa be the agent event system
for a ∈ X. Let ESP be the event system for the platform. A multi-agent system ESX+ = (EX+ , IX+,OX+ ,TrX+) with
respect to a set of agents X and the platform P is defined by ESX+ = (‖x∈X ESx) ‖ ESP .
Given our scenario of customers and merchants we instantiate Definition 8 to obtain the comparison-shopping
system:
Definition Ex-3 (Event system for comparison shopping). Let ESma be the event system for a merchant agent ma ∈
Am, let ESca be the event system for a customer agent ca ∈ Ac, and let ESP be the event system for the platform.
Then, the event system ESCS+ = (ECS+ , ICS+ ,OCS+ ,TrCS+) specifying the virtual mall for the comparison-shopping
scenario is defined by
ESCS+ = (‖ma∈Am ESma) ‖ (‖ca∈Ac ESca) ‖ ESP .
3. Modeling security requirements
Security requirements originate for multi-agent-based virtual malls, on one hand, from the need to protect an agent’s
asset (for instance, to keep a piece of information confidential until it has been paid for) and, on the other hand, from
the need to establish an environment for trading that is fair, in some sense, for the participants. From the manifold
security requirements in such a setting, we select one particular requirement. This security requirement serves as the
running example in this article:
Confidentiality of offers:
A merchant agent ma shall not obtain information about the offers made by other merchant agents to any given
customer agent ca.
This requirement captures one aspect of fair trading. If some merchants were able to learn about offers made by other
merchants then they could exploit this information by incrementally underbidding others’ offers immediately after
they have been made. Such unfair trading behavior is prevented by the above security requirement. If the requirement
is satisfied for a given merchant then neither his merchant agent nor the customer agents to whom his agent has made
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of offers is a global security requirement involving the overall virtual mall and not only a single agent. In Section 4, we
discuss how such global security requirements can be enforced by establishing local guarantees about the individual
agents. In the current section, we focus on how this global requirement can be formalized in an unambiguous way.
Confidentiality of offers involves two sets of events. Firstly, there is the set of events modeling that another mer-
chant’s agent makes an offer to the given customer agent:
COffersma,ca = {sendma′(ca,o) | ma′ ∈Am ∧ ma′ = ma ∧ o ∈ Offers}.
These events involve secrets that shall be kept confidential from ma.
Secondly, there is the set of all events in which ma can engage and whose occurrences he therefore notices or, in
other words, the events that are visible to ma:
V Offersma = Ema.
Obviously, there would be a violation of the given security requirement if some events were both confidential and
visible to ma. Fortunately, there are no such events because COffersma,ca ∩ V Offersma = ∅ follows from our definitions. While
it is a necessary condition for the given security requirement that this intersection is empty, this condition alone is not
sufficient. A merchant’s agent might be able to deduce information about occurrences of events from his observations
even though he cannot directly see the occurrence of these events. There are other ways for communicating a secret
piece of data than transmitting it directly to the recipient. It can be transmitted in encoded form, after fragmenting it,
or via intermediaries. Thus, the goal is not merely to prevent an attacker from seeing a secret piece of data, but rather
to prevent his observations from depending on the secret. In other words, no information must flow from the secret to
the attacker’s observations.
Numerous properties have been proposed to properly capture the lack of unwanted information flow in various
situations. Here, we focus on the class of possibilistic information flow properties. Prominent examples from this
class are generalized noninterference [23], noninference [33], and separability [24].
3.1. The modular assembly kit for security properties
We employ the Modular Assembly Kit for Security Properties (brief: MAKS) as the conceptual basis for the spec-
ification and verification of security requirements in our case study. The MAKS was originally intended as a formal
framework for the uniform representation and the comparison of the known possibilistic information flow properties
[18]. The framework turned out to also be suitable for a goal-directed derivation of novel information flow properties,
of compositionality results, and of unwinding theorems [19–22].
In the MAKS, an information flow property is composed of two elements, a set of views and a security predicate.
The security predicate is, again, defined in a modular fashion by assembling a non-empty set of so called basic security
predicates (hence, the name Modular Assembly Kit), each of which imposes very primitive restrictions on the flow of
information.
A view defines the secrets and the observational capabilities of the attacker. This is achieved by identifying the set of
all events that introduce secrets into the system and the set of all events whose occurrences are visible to the attacker.
As a convention, we denote the set of confidential events by C and the set of visible events by V (possibly with
sub-/superscripts and primes). As explained before, the intersection of these sets must be empty. A third set of events
arises for a given specification by collecting all the remaining events (denoted by N for non-confidential/non-visible).
Definition 9 (View). A view V = (V ,N,C) in a set of events E is a triple such that V , N , C forms a disjoint partition
of E.
Please notice the differences in notation. Throughout the paper we use a caligraphical V to denote views while the
standard V refers to visible events within a view V .
We summarize our previous considerations about confidentiality issues with respect to merchants in the following
example of a view.
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VOffersma,ca =
(
V Offersma,ca ,N
Offers
ma,ca ,C
Offers
ma,ca
)
by defining
V Offersma,ca = V Offersma = Ema,
NOffersma,ca = ECS+ \
(
V Offersma,ca ∪COffersma,ca
)
,
COffersma,ca = {sendma′(ca,o) | ma′ = ma ∧ o ∈ Offers}.
Possibilistic information flow security is expressed by the condition that a system’s set of possible traces must be
closed in some sense. The underlying intuition is that if a given set of traces is “closed” then, for any given observation
of an attacker, so many traces could have possibly generated this observation that it is impossible for him to deduce
any secret information from his observation. A security predicate is a closure condition that is parametric in a view
and that is composed of basic security predicates. A basic security predicate BSP is a (primitive) closure condition of
sets of traces that is parametric in a view. For a given view V in E and a set Tr ⊆ E∗, BSPV (Tr) holds if and only if
the closure condition is satisfied by Tr for V . A security predicate SP is defined by a non-empty set of BSPs, which
are conjunctively connected. This means, SPV (Tr) holds if and only if BSPV (Tr) holds for each BSP contained in the
set of BSPs that defines SP.
There is already a collection of concrete BSPs for the MAKS. Each of these BSPs can be categorized into one of
two dimensions. BSPs from the first dimension perturb a given trace by deleting occurrences of confidential events
and thereby ensure that an attacker cannot deduce that a particular confidential event must have occurred. The intuition
for a given view (V ,N,C) is as follows: If, for each possible trace of the form β.〈c〉.α (where α,β ∈ E∗ and c ∈ C),
the trace β.α is also a possible trace of the system then an attacker who observes the sequence (β.〈c〉.α)|V cannot tell
whether β.〈c〉.α or β.α has actually occurred. This implies that he cannot tell that the confidential event c must have
occurred. If a system’s set of possible traces is closed under such a closure condition for the view of a given attacker
then this attacker cannot tell from his observations that a given confidential event has occurred, and, moreover, he
cannot tell that any confidential event has occurred at all.
BSPs from the second dimension perturb a trace by inserting occurrences of confidential events and thereby ensure
that an attacker cannot deduce that a particular confidential event cannot have occurred. If, for each possible trace
of the form β.α, the trace β.〈c〉.α is also a possible trace of the system then an attacker who observes the sequence
(β.α)|V cannot tell that the confidential event c cannot have occurred.
One can further distinguish the BSPs within each dimension depending on the corrections that are permitted.
A BSP is called strict if it requires each perturbation of each possible trace to be a possible trace. One obtains a
weaker closure condition by permitting corrections to the perturbed trace. A BSP is called non-strict if it requires that,
for each perturbation t ′ of each possible trace τ , there is a possible trace τ ′ that equals t ′ in its occurrences of visible
and confidential events. The intuition underlying this softening of the closure requirement is that the possibility of a
trace τ ′ is almost as good as the possibility of the trace t ′ for creating uncertainty for the attacker about the confidential
events that have actually occurred. There are also BSPs that constrain the positions where a perturbed trace may be
corrected. Most prominent are the so called backwards-strict BSPs that permit only causal corrections, i.e., corrections
to the right of the position where the perturbation modified the given trace. One advantage of backwards-strict BSPs
is that they are capable of ruling out some attacks that the non-strict BSPs fail to detect.1
The following definition introduces two BSPs, Backwards-Strict Deletion of Confidential Events (brief: BSD) and
Backwards-Strict Insertion of Confidential Events (brief: BSI), in full detail. For the formal definition of further BSPs
and their characteristics, we refer the reader to [16,18,20–22].
Definition 11 (BSD and BSI). Let ES = (E, I,O,Tr) be an event system and let V = (V ,N,C) be a view in E.
BSDV (Tr) ≡ ∀α,β ∈ E∗.∀c ∈ C.[(β.〈c〉.α ∈ Tr ∧ α|C = 〈〉) ⇒ ∃α′ ∈ E∗.(β.α′ ∈ Tr ∧ α′|V∪C = α|V∪C)],
BSIV (Tr) ≡ ∀α,β ∈ E∗. ∀c ∈ C. [(β.α ∈ Tr ∧ α|C = 〈〉) ⇒ ∃α′ ∈ E∗.(β.〈c〉.α′ ∈ Tr ∧ α′|V∪C = α|V∪C)].
1 Such attacks involve a Trojan horse that is capable of observing occurrences of events in N (see Section 3.2.2 in [22] for further details).
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of a confidential event, there is some possible trace τ ′ that differs from t ′ only in occurrences of events from N and
these differences only occur to the right of the position where the occurrence of the confidential event has been deleted.
If BSIV (Tr) holds then, for any trace t ′ that results from a possible trace τ by inserting an occurrence of a confidential
event at a position where no confidential events occur to the right, there is some possible trace τ ′ that differs from t ′
only in occurrences of events from N and these differences only occur to the right of the position where the occurrence
of the confidential event has been inserted.
While we focus on a single information flow property in our case study, one gains several benefits from using
this more general framework. Firstly, this allows us to re-use already existing compositionality results and unwinding
theorems in our security analysis. Secondly, the MAKS cleanly separates the definition of a security policy, which is
captured in a so called view, from the definition of an information flow property. We use the notion of views as the
basis for the second step in our two-step decomposition methodology. Finally, one aim of our case study is to provide a
guideline for future information flow analyses of other multi-agent systems. We expect the use of MAKS to be helpful
in finding and defining suitable information flow properties, which might differ from the one used in our case study.
Once the security requirement has been specified in the MAKS, the security analysis can be carried out along the same
lines as in our exemplary analysis while benefiting from existing compositionality results and unwinding theorems.
3.2. Formalizing security requirements in the case study
We are now in the position to illustrate the specification of security requirements of multi-agent systems more
concretely. To this end, we complete the specification of the security requirement discussed already at the beginning
of this section:
Confidentiality of offers (refined):
No merchant agent ma shall be able to deduce from his observations any information about the offers that have
been made by other merchant agents to a given customer agent ca.
Formally, we obtain the view VOffersma,ca (defined in Example 10) for each pair of a merchant agent ma and a customer
agent ca in the system. The set of visible events for ma is defined by V Offersma = Ema because an agent notices the
occurrence of events in which he can engage. Events are confidential if they model that another merchant agent is
making an offer to ca, i.e., if they have the form sendma′(ca,o). Hence, we define the set of confidential events (in
Example 10) by COffersma,ca = {sendma′(ca,o) | ma′ = ma ∧ o ∈ Offers}. The set NOffersma,ca contains the remaining events,
i.e., NOffersma,ca = ECS+ \ (V Offersma,ca ∪COffersma,ca).
By applying this construction for each pair consisting of a merchant agent ma and a customer agent ca, we obtain
the following set of views:
VSOffers = {VOffersma,ca | ma ∈Am ∧ ca ∈Ac}.
Our example requirement demands that a merchant agent must not be capable of deducing from his observations that
another merchant must have made a particular offer. Therefore, we have to employ a BSP from the first dimension.
Among the various possible BSPs in the first dimension, we select BSD. We could also have chosen a non-strict
BSP instead and the analyses could be performed along the same lines as in Sections 4 and 5 (e.g., for the BSP R
that perturbs a given trace by removing all occurrences of confidential events at once and that permits corrections at
arbitrary positions). In comparison to using a non-strict BSP, using a backwards-strict BSP has the aforementioned
advantage of detecting some subtle attacks and, moreover, showing BSD for the system is a strong result as BSDV (Tr)
implies RV (Tr) [22]. If the security requirement were that the attacker must not be capable of deducing that a particular
offer cannot have been made by another merchant then one would use a BSP from the second dimension instead of,
or in addition to, the BSP from the first dimension. However, this is not necessary for our example requirement.
The following definition summarizes our specification of the security requirement.
Definition Ex-4 (Confidentiality of offers). We say that the virtual mall satisfies confidentiality of offers if and only if
BSDV (TrCS+) holds for each V ∈ VSOffers.
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As mentioned before, many security requirements are global properties of the entire system. In particular, our
example secrecy requirement cannot be enforced by a single agent in any sensible way. The offer of a merchant ma
can only remain confidential for another merchant ma′ = ma if the offer is not leaked to ma′ by ma itself and if it
is not leaked by any other agent that receives ma’s offer. Instead of approaching the security analysis of the entire
multi-agent system as one big monolithic task, it is good practice to split up this task into smaller ones: analyzing
agents individually and afterwards combining the analysis results. As usual, this helps us in reducing the complexity
when analyzing larger systems and, hereby, contributes to making the approach scale up.
Additionally, we want to characterize the contributions of individual participants to the overall security property
without referring to any unnecessary details of these agents. For instance, we want to leave underspecified how this
contribution will be implemented in the end. This means that we have to formulate properties of single agents such
that the satisfaction of these properties guarantee the global security property. The properties that we end up with are
again confidentiality properties, similar to the ones for the whole system, except that they only concern individual
agents of the platform.
In other words, we deal (a) with properties of single agents, (b) with properties of the whole system, and (c) with
the relationship between both. This leaves us with several questions:
• What requirements do we formulate for individual agents and for the platform such that the fulfillment of these
requirements guarantee the global property? This is a design question.
• Which agents can we assume to respect the requirements that we assume them to respect? This is a question of
trust in, or of control over, agents.
• How can we establish that properties of single agents compose to the global property that we require? This is a
question of compositionality of our security properties.
We will discuss these issues in reverse order in the rest of this section. The resulting decomposition theorem is similar
to the one in [38], where, however, confidentiality requirements, assumptions about the platform, and conditions on
the single agents are different. The theorem is derived using the strategy described in [38].
4.1. Compositionality of security properties
Let us assume that, both the agents and the platform in a multi-agent system, satisfy some security property. The
question arises whether we can conclude from this assumption that the composed system also satisfies some security
property.
The framework that we use as the conceptual basis for expressing and verifying confidentiality properties in this
case study provides compositionality results for some of the basic security predicates. In particular, there are results for
the basic security predicate BSD that we have used to formulate the overall security property. The following theorem,
which is the part of Theorem 3 from [21] concerned with BSD, states that if certain conditions are met concerning the
relationship between, for instance, the views V1, V2, and the global security view V then the local security properties
imply a global security property.
Theorem 12 (Compositionality [21]). Let ESi = (Ei, Ii,Oi,Tri ) (for i = 1,2) and ES = (E, I,O,Tr) = ES1 ‖ ES2
be event systems. Let Vi = (Vi,Ni,Ci) (for i = 1,2) and V = (V ,N,C) be views over Ei and E, resp., such that
V ∩Ei = Vi , C ∩Ei ⊆ Ci (for i = 1,2), and N1 ∩E2 = N2 ∩E1 = ∅ hold. Then BSDV1(Tr1) and BSDV2(Tr2) imply
BSDV (Tr).
Our intention is to employ the theorem backwards: given a global security property for the whole multi-agent
system, how can we “invent” local security properties for the individual agents such that they compose to the global
security property? Answering this question is often non-trivial, in particular, as one also needs to respect requirements
that are not concerned with security. For instance, ma′’s offer will remain confidential for ma if ma′ does not send
any offers to other agents at all. From the viewpoint of secrecy, this would be a viable solution. However, when one
takes other requirements into account, it becomes clear how ridiculous the solution is. It would effectively preclude
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his offers to all agents except ma. In this case, one would need to trust all agents to not leak offers to ma. This is
not acceptable either, unless one were willing to trust all agents on the platform to preserve the confidentiality of
the given offers. Therefore, some other solution for decomposing the global security requirement is required. In the
following, we derive a decomposition of our example requirement. We also provide more general remarks on how to
decompose such global security requirements. This shall facilitate using our exemplary security analysis as a guideline
for analyzing other multi-agent systems.
4.2. Decomposition of security properties
We are interested in global security properties of multi-agent system demanding that some secret is kept confiden-
tial from a set Ω of agents. We call these agents observers and formalize the secret as a set of events C that have to be
kept secret from the observers. Observers can only monitor their own events EΩ while all other events are non-visible.
This gives rise to the following notion of global security views:
Definition 13 (Global security view). Let Ω ⊆A be a set of agents and C ⊆ EA\Ω be a set of events. Then, a global
security view Vg[Ω,C] = (Vg[Ω,C],Ng[Ω,C],Cg[Ω,C]) with respect to Ω and C is defined by
Vg[Ω,C] = EΩ, Cg[Ω,C] = C, Ng[Ω,C] = EA+ \ (C ∪EΩ).
Instantiating the basic security predicate BSD with a global security view formalizes the property that no observer
in Ω can deduce anything about the occurrence of an event in C.
Consider, for instance, the views VOffersma,ca . Each of these views VOffersma,ca obviously constitutes a global security view
with respect to the (observing) merchant ma and a customer ca:
VOffersma,ca = Vg[{ma},C] with C = {sendma′(ca,o) | ma′ = ma ∧ o ∈ Offers}.
The basic security property BSD using the view VOffersma,ca ensures that a merchant ma can not deduce that any other
merchant has sent an offer to a customer ca.
Instead of proving directly a global security property of the entire system, our goal is to design individual local
security properties that compose to the requested global security property and that allow us to realize the functionality
that we originally wanted to achieve by the system. We will do this in several steps. Each of the steps will provide
a definition of properties that are sufficient conditions for the preceding properties to hold. At the end we obtain a
decomposition theorem (Theorem 20) which assures us that the requested global security property follows from the
local security properties for a subset of the individual agents provided that certain assumptions about these properties
hold. The development of this decomposition theorem also serves as a guideline for how to find the appropriate subset
of agents and their respective security requirements.
4.2.1. Separating friends and observers
The first step in our decomposition methodology is concerned with the categorization of agents into friends and
observers. This results in two disjoint sets of agents, a set Φ of friends and a set Ω of observers (i.e., A= Φ unionmulti Ω).
Trusted agents that need to know the secret have to be categorized as friends. Agents that we do not trust or that we
cannot control must not obtain the secret. These agents have to be categorized as observers. Each of the remaining
agents can be freely placed in either category. As the security requirement is trivially fulfilled for the subsystem of
observers, the larger Ω can sensibly be, the better. However, the larger the set Ω is the stronger the constraints are
for the subsystem of friends because friends must not exchange confidential events with observers. In particular, one
might not be able to complete the security analysis if one chooses a too large set Ω .
The following lemma exemplifies that one strengthens the security property by placing more agents into the ob-
servers category:
Lemma 14. Let Ω ⊂A, Ω ′ ⊆ Ω and C ⊆ EA\Ω . Then BSDV (TrA+) implies BSDV ′ (TrA+).g[Ω,C] g[Ω ,C]
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Proof. This lemma is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 in [21]2 using the fact that Vg[Ω ′,C] ⊆ Vg[Ω,C] and
Cg[Ω ′,C] ⊆ Cg[Ω,C] holds. 
Consider a view VOffersma,ca representing that merchant ma should not learn the offers of other merchants sent to a
customer ca. Thus, ma constitutes an observer. Other merchants send offers to ca, but no other customer agent really
needs to know about these offers for the protocol to work. Therefore all customers different from ca are considered
also as observers. Note that the set of confidential events includes the transmission of all offers that ca receives from
any merchant different from ma. Therefore, no other merchant (potentially sending a confidential offer to ca) can be
considered as an observer together with ma. Hence, in the example, we choose Ω = (Ac \ {ca})∪ {ma}.
The classification of agents into observers and friends allows us to split the multi-agent system into two separate
subsystems (cf. Fig. 6):
• The system ESΦ+ consists of the platform and all friends Φ: we require that this subsystem keeps the secrets con-
fidential for a fictitious observer that can see the complete interface of the subsystem (i.e., all messages entering
or leaving the subsystem via the platform). This is defined in Definition 15.
• The system ESΩ consists of all observers Ω : agents in Ω can observe the other system via their interfaces, and
since we assume that the secret is kept secret from their interfaces using ESΦ+ , we actually do not need to require
anything from the observers.
Accordingly, in the following we define a view Vfr[Φ,C] for ESΦ+ that ensures that no secret is leaked inspecting
its interface to the outside. This interface consists of the communication lines between the platform and the observers
of the original system. Thus, C is again the set of confidential events, the set of visible events are all events of the
system to the outside, i.e., all events originally denoting messages between platform and observer. All other events are
considered as being non-visible.
Definition 15 (Security view for friends). Let Φ ⊆A, and let C ⊆ EΦ . Then the security view for friends Vfr[Φ,C] =
(Vfr[Φ,C],Nfr[Φ,C],Cfr[Φ,C]) over EΦ+ with respect to Φ and C is defined by
Vfr[Φ,C] = EP ∩EA\Φ, Cfr[Φ,C] = C, Nfr[Φ,C] = EΦ+ \ ((EP ∩EA\Φ)∪C).
It turns out that—due to the construction of Vfr[Φ,C]—the intended security property of the overall system
BSDVg[Ω,C](TrA+) is a consequence of the corresponding security property BSDVfr[Φ,C](TrΦ+) of ESΦ+ . The following
lemma illustrates this:
Lemma 16. Let A= Φ unionmultiΩ and C ⊆ EΦ . Then BSDVfr[Φ,C](TrΦ+) implies BSDVg[Ω,C](TrA+).
2 Theorem 1 relates various basic security predicates with respect to different views.
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rem 12, instantiating ES with ESA+ , ES1 with ESΦ+ , ES2 with ESΩ , V1 with Vfr[Φ,C], and V2 with (V2,N2,C2) =
(EΩ, {}, {}). The applicability conditions for the theorem are satisfied, as can easily be computed (note that EΦ and
EΩ are disjoint and that A \Φ = Ω):
Vg[Ω,C] ∩EΦ+ = EΩ ∩ (EΦ ∪EP ) = EΩ ∩EP = Vfr[Φ,C],
Vg[Ω,C] ∩EΩ = EΩ = V2,
Cg[Ω,C] ∩EΦ+ = C ∩EΦ+ = C = Cfr[Φ,C],
Cg[Ω,C] ∩EΩ = C ∩EΩ = ∅ = C2,
N2 ∩EΦ+ = ∅ ∩EΦ+ = ∅.
The remaining condition Nfr[Φ,C] ∩ EΩ = ∅ is also satisfied: Nfr[Φ,C] and Vfr[Φ,C] are disjoint. Vfr[Φ,C] = EP ∩
EA\Φ = EP ∩ EΩ can be written as EΦ+ ∩ EΩ because EΦ and EΩ are disjoint. Finally, Nfr[Φ,C] ⊆ EΦ+ and we
get
Nfr[Φ,C] ∩EΩ = Nfr[Φ,C] ∩EΦ+ ∩EΩ = Nfr[Φ,C] ∩ Vfr[Φ,C] = ∅.
Thus, the theorem is applicable and we can conclude that BSDVfr[Φ,C](TrΦ+) and BSDV2(TrΩ) implies
BSDVg[Ω,C](TrA+). By Theorem 5 in [21],3 BSDV2(TrΩ) holds trivially (because there are no confidential events),
so we can conclude that BSDVfr[Φ,C](TrΦ+) is a sufficient condition for BSDVg[Ω,C](TrA+). 
In our comparison-shopping scenario, this means for a given choice of ma and ca that we do not need to inspect
the behavior of the merchant agent ma or any of the customer agents different from ca, since they are not even
involved in the definition of ESΦ+ . This will simplify our remaining part of the design and verification task consider-
ably.
4.2.2. Imposing constraints on friends
In a next step we will decompose the security requirement for ESΦ+ into local security requirements for individual
agents in Φ such that the original requirement is enforced. The idea here is to mentally divide each friend, as it were,
into a confidential part that ‘deals with the secret’, and a public part that does not. Each agent itself now needs to
satisfy the property that prevents it from leaking the secret from the confidential part to the public part. Additionally,
all friends need to agree not to leak the secret from their confidential part to the public part of another friend. This
will be ensured by side conditions that require the platform to appropriately match a send-event and its corresponding
receive-event: incoming public messages will be forwarded as public ones and also all delivered public messages are
already received as being public. In this case we can prove the following lemma stating that the platform will not leak
information:
Lemma 17. Let VP = (VP ,∅,CP ) be a view for EP such that senda(b,m) ∈ VP iff recvb(a,m) ∈ VP for all a, b ∈A.
Then BSDVP (TrP ).
Proof. We sketch a direct proof of this lemma because the platform’s specification is intentionally extremely simple
and we are mainly interested in the agents after all. However, a proof using techniques described in Section 5 is also
possible.
According to Definition 11, it is sufficient to show that β.α ∈ TrP for all sequences of events α,β ∈ E∗P under the
assumptions β.〈c〉.α ∈ TrP , α|CP = 〈〉, and c ∈ CP .
First note that each send-event is always enabled, and that each recva(b,m)-event is enabled if the platform buffers
at least one message m for a sent by b. This is the case after a possible trace γ if only more sendb(a,m)-events than
recva(b,m)-events (with the same arguments a, b,m) have happened in γ . In this case, at least one tuple [a, b,m] is
in the multi-set of messages buffered for a from b.
3 Theorem 5 presents trivially satisfied security predicates for systems that do not operate on confidential data or whose behavior does not result
in any visible output.
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(1) c = senda(b,m) for some a, b ∈A and m ∈M: Because α|C = 〈〉, recvb(a,m) does not occur in α. The enabled-
ness of all other events—in particular for those in α—does not depend on c, so β.α ∈ TrP .
(2) c = recva(b,m) for some a, b ∈A and m ∈M: Again, because α|C = 〈〉, sendb(a,m) does not occur in α, and
no other event’s enabledness depends on c, so β.α ∈ Tr. 
The following definition formalizes the necessary conditions on the behavior of friends that allow us to decompose
the security view for all friends into individual views for each friend: All messages to the outside are public, corre-
sponding send- and receive-events between friends are either both classified or both visible, messages of friends to
the platform are either classified or visible (but not non-visible) and global secrets C are considered confidential by
all friends.
Definition 18 (C-preserving individual views). Let Φ ⊆ A and C ⊆ EΦ . A family (Va)a∈Φ of views Va =
(Va,Na,Ca) for Ea is C-preserving iff
(1) a ∈ Φ and b /∈ Φ implies senda(b,m) ∈ Va and recva(b,m) ∈ Va for any m.
(2) a, a′ ∈ Φ implies
(a) senda(a′,m) ∈ Ca iff recva′(a,m) ∈ Ca′ and
(b) senda(a′,m) ∈ Va iff recva′(a,m) ∈ Va′ .
(3) EP ∩Ea ⊆ Ca ∪ Va for all a ∈ Φ .
(4) C ∩Ea ⊆ Ca for all a ∈ Φ .
The following lemma guarantees the soundness of considering BSD with respect to the individual views of the
friends instead of proving BSD with respect to the more complex friends’ system view.
Lemma 19. Let Φ ⊆A and C ⊆ EΦ . If a family (V)a∈Φ of views is C-preserving and BSDVa (Tra) holds for all a ∈ Φ
then BSDVfr[Φ,C](TrΦ+) holds.
Proof. We proceed in two steps. For arbitrary sets X ⊆ Φ , let the auxiliary view V ′X = (V ′X,N ′X,C′X) over EX+ be
defined by
(1)V ′X = (EP ∩EA\Φ)∪
(( ⋃
a∈Φ
Va
)
∩EP
)
∪
(⋃
a∈X
Va
)
,
(2)C′X =
(( ⋃
a∈Φ
Ca
)
∩EP
)
∪
(⋃
a∈X
Ca
)
,
(3)N ′X = EX+ \ (V ′X ∪C′X).
V ′X comprises the events of all friends in X and the events of the platform that include, in particular, also send and
recv events of the platform to all other agents in A.
(1) For any X ⊆ Φ , BSDVa (Tra) for all a ∈ X implies BSDV ′X(TrX+): Proof by induction on the size of X.
(a) Base case X = ∅: therefore, V ′∅ = EP ∩ (EA\Φ ∪ (
⋃
a∈Φ Va)), C′∅ = EP \ (
⋃
a∈Φ Ca), and N ′∅ = EP \ (V ′∅ ∪
C′∅) = (
⋃
a∈Φ Na) ∩ EP = ∅. With V ′∅ = VP the preconditions of Lemma 17 is satisfied and BSDV ′∅(TrP )
holds.
(b) Step case: Let a ∈ Φ \X. ESX+ and ES{a} are composable, and we have ESX∪{a}+ = ESX+ ‖ ES{a}. We apply
Theorem 12 to show
BSDV ′X(TrX+) and BSDVa (Tra) implies BSDV ′X∪{a}(TrX∪{a}+)
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easily checked:
V ′X∪{a} ∩EX+ = V ′X, C′X∪{a} ∩EX+ = C′X,
V ′X∪{a} ∩Ea = Va, C′X∪{a} ∩Ea = Ca,
N ′X ∩Ea = ∅, EX+ ∩Na = ∅.
The conditions for visible and confidential events follow directly from (1), for the conditions for N -events,
condition (3) of Definition 18 is crucial. It implies that no event in EP is an N -event, and therefore events in
Na cannot be members of any other set EX+ or N ′X unless a ∈ X, which would contradict the assumption of
the step case. Similarly, any event in N ′X is in Na′ for some a = a′, and Ea and Ea′ are disjoint.
(2) BSDV ′Φ (TrΦ+) implies BSDVfr[Φ,C](TrΦ+): The result again follows immediately from Theorem 1 in [21], if we
can only show that Cfr[Φ,C] ⊆ C′Φ and Vfr[Φ,C] ⊆ V ′Φ . The latter is obvious from the definition of V ′Φ . For the
former we have Cfr[Φ,C] = C and C ⊆ EΦ . Thus for each event e ∈ Cfr[Φ,C] = C there is an agent a ∈ Φ such that
e ∈ Ea . Since C ∩Ea ⊆ Ca , we have e ∈ Ca and thus e ∈ C′Φ as required.
By transitivity, from (1) for X = Φ and (2) we conclude the conjecture. 
4.2.3. Overall decomposition
Starting with a global system view and dividing the set of agents into friends and observers we finally arrived at
individual views of friends. Proving BSD with respect to these individual views will guarantee that BSD of the overall
system holds. The following theorem formalizes this property.
Theorem 20 (Overall decomposition). Let A = Φ unionmulti Ω , v ∈ Ω and C ⊆ EΦ . If a family (V)a∈Φ of views is C-
preserving and BSDVa (Tra) holds for all a ∈ Φ then BSDVg[{v},C](TrA+) holds.
Theorem 20 follows directly from Lemmas 14, 16, and 19.
The given procedure is a recipe which does not, by any means, fix the requirements of an individual agent, but it
considerably cuts down the design search space by providing rules-of-thumb reasoning, the outcome of which can
then directly be checked for correctness.
Theorem 20 only deals with BSD, as this is the only security property that was needed for the accompanying case
study. This is not a restriction of the decomposition recipe, however, and similar theorems can be provided for other
basic security predicates. For example, [38] and [39] provide a similar theorem based on the same procedure for BSD
and BSIA. Differences in technical detail are due to the fact that BSIA is parametrized by a filter function, which needs
to be accounted for by additional conditions, and that compositionality of BSIA presupposes BSD. For more details
the interested reader is referred to [38].
4.2.4. Decomposition for comparison shopping
According to our requirements formulated in Section 3.2, we consider the customer ca receiving offers and all
merchants ma′ = ma that want to keep their offers to ca confidential from ma as friends. The merchant ma and all
other customers are observers. Hence to verify the security property BSD with respect to a view V Offersma,ca ∈ VSOffers, the
only agents that need to be analyzed in detail are the customer agent ca and all merchant agents ma′ different from ma.
However, since all other merchants ma′ behave uniformly we can treat them uniformly. So we choose views Vcama,ca
for the customer ca and Vma′ma,ca for a merchant ma′ such that BSD holds with respect to both views and Theorem 20
will be applicable. The views are presented in the following definition:
Definition Ex-5 (Local views). Let ma be a merchant agent (the observer) and ca be an arbitrary customer agent. The
view Vcama,ca = (V cama,ca,Ncama,ca,Ccama,ca) for ca with respect to ma and ca is defined by
V cama,ca = Eca \
{
Ncama,ca ∪Ccama,ca
}
,
Ncama,ca = Intca,
Ccama,ca = {recvca(ma′,o), sendca(ma′,buy(o)) | ma′ = ma,o ∈ Offers}.
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V ma
′
ma,ca = Ema′ \
(
Cma
′
ma,ca ∪Nma
′
ma,ca
)
,
Nma
′
ma,ca = Intma′ ,
Cma
′
ma,ca = {sendma′(ca,o), recvma′(ca,buy(o)) | o ∈ Offers}.
We delay the proofs that BSD holds with respect to these views till the next section and discuss now the applicability
of Theorem 20 instantiating v by ma and C by COffersma,ca . As mentioned before Φ is the set {ca} ∪ (Am \ {ma}).
In detail, we have to show that v = ma ∈A \ Φ , C ⊆ EΦ (this holds because both ca and ma′ = ma are friends),
and that (Va)a∈Φ is C-preserving. We sketch the conditions from Definition 18:
(1) For all a ∈ Φ , V ama,ca includes all send- and receive-events except some events between the friends ca and some
ma′.
(2) No send- or receive-event is in the N -events for any local view, the sets Cma′ma,ca and Cma
′′
ma,ca are symmetric such that
(a) corresponding send- and receive-events are both confidential, and thus (b) all other send- and receive-events
are visible.
(3) The only N -events are internal events, and none of these is ever an event of the platform.
(4) All events in COffersma,ca are also confidential events in the respective merchant agents’ views.
This means that the theorem is applicable and the choices are suitable as far as the decomposition is concerned. The
following section shows that the choices are also suitable insofar as the specifications given in Section 2 actually
satisfy the corresponding security properties.
5. Agent verification
By applying our decomposition methodology, we reduced the problem of verifying the global security requirement
BSDVg[{v},C](TrA+) for the entire multi-agent system to the problem of verifying the corresponding security require-
ments BSDVa (Tra) for all friends a ∈ Φ . One could attempt to verify directly the local requirements for each system
component. This would involve showing that the set of possible traces of the given component is closed as prescribed
by the definition of BSD and the specification of the view Va . Such proofs usually follow a common pattern, which
includes an inductive argument over the length of traces. Unwinding is a proof technique for these properties that
reduces the closure condition on sets of traces to several conditions on local transitions, the unwinding conditions.
An unwinding theorem ensures that the set of unwinding conditions implies the given closure property. The inductive
argument is done once and for all in the proof of the unwinding theorem. Applying the unwinding technique often
eases the prove of an information flow property considerably.
MAKS provides unwinding conditions and unwinding theorems for each basic security predicate [19,22]. Prov-
ing a security predicate assembled from several basic security predicates is simply done by proving the unwinding
conditions for each of the respective BSPs.
A proof by unwinding is done directly on the level of a state-event system (e.g., a customer state-event system or a
merchant state-event system) and not on the level of the induced event system, on which we focused when defining the
security requirements in the preceding section. Verification by unwinding can be divided into the following subtasks.
• Firstly, one chooses an unwinding relation , which is a binary relation on states. Intuitively, the aim of defining
an unwinding relation is to establish an ordering on states such that if s  s′ holds for two states s and s′ then
every observation that can be made starting in s is also a possible observation starting in s′. Hence, the observer
looking at the system in state s cannot exclude from his observations the possibility that the system might be in
state s′.4
4 Often, unwinding relations are introduced as a symmetric notion of indistinguishability (see, e.g., [34,35]). In such a setting, two states may
only be related s1  s′1 if exactly the same observations are possible in the two states. It has been demonstrated that the unwinding technique is
more precise if one does not assume that the unwinding relation is symmetric [19] and we need this added precision in our case study.
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• Finally, one applies the unwinding theorem for the given BSPs in order to deduce the security predicate.
Before we start the verification by unwinding, we give a brief introduction to the unwinding theorem that we apply
for proving BSDVa (Tra).
Output step consistency (osc) is an unwinding condition that occurs as a precondition in the unwinding theorem
for each basic security predicate in MAKS. The purpose of osc is to capture the intuition of the unwinding relation:
if s1  s′1 and the system is in state s1 then the observer should not be able to exclude from his observations the
possibility that the system might be in state s′1. If for any given two states s1 and s′1 with s1  s′1 and any event e
causing a transition from s1 to s2 there is a sequence of events that yields the same observation to the observer and
that transforms s′1 to a state s′2 with s2  s′2 then s1  s′1 indeed implies that any observation possible in s1 is also
possible in s′1, which is what we wanted to capture.
Definition 21 (Unwinding condition osc). Let SES = (E, I,O,S, s0, T ) be a state-event system,  ⊆ S × S and
V = (V ,N,C) be a view in E. Then the unwinding condition osc with respect to SES and V is given by
oscV (T ,) ≡ ∀s1, s2, s′1 ∈ S ∀e ∈ E \C.
(reachable(SES, s1)∧ reachable(SES, s′1)∧ s1  s′1 ∧ T (s1, e, s2)) ⇒∃s′2 ∈ S ∃δ ∈ (E \C)∗ . (T (s′1, δ, s′2)∧ δ|V = 〈e〉|V ∧ s2  s′2).
Locally-respects forwards (lrf ) is an unwinding condition specific to BSD. BSD requires that deleting a confidential
event c from a possible trace yields another possible trace causing the same low-level observations. Corrections of
non-visible events after the deleted confidential event are allowed. This intuition can be captured by demanding that
the state after the occurrence of c must be in relation with the state before that occurrence since all observations
possible after the occurrence of c must still be possible if the occurrence of c were deleted.
Definition 22 (Unwinding condition lrf ). Let SES = (E, I,O,S, s0, T ) be a state-event system,  ⊆ S × S, and
V = (V ,N,C) be a view in E. The unwinding condition lrf (locally-respects forwards) with respect to SES and V is
given by:
lrfV (T ,) ≡ ∀s, s′ ∈ S.∀c ∈ C.[(reachable(SES, s)∧ T (s, c, s′)) ⇒ s′  s].
The following unwinding theorem states that if these two unwinding conditions hold for some state-event system
then BSD holds for the corresponding event systems. A proof of this theorem can be found in [22].
Theorem 23 (Unwinding theorem [19,22]). Let SES = (E, I,O,S, s0, T ) be a state event system, ES = (E, I,O,Tr)
be the corresponding event system, and  ⊆ S × S. Then,
(lrfV (T ,)∧ oscV (T ,)) implies BSDV (Tr).
5.1. Speculating unwinding relations
The speculation of an appropriate unwinding relation  is a creative process that usually requires detailed knowl-
edge about the system specification. On a more general level, one can make two observations. Firstly, in order to
fulfill the requirements of lrf , the relation has to relate the states s and s′ if s′ is a successor state of s with respect to a
confidential event. This suggests choosing a large unwinding relation. Secondly, the more states  relates, the weaker
the preconditions are that one can use to prove osc. This suggests choosing a small unwinding relation. This conflict
contributes to the difficulty of finding a suitable unwinding relation.
5.1.1. Comparison-shopping scenario: unwinding relation for customer agents
Consider the customer in the phase of requesting offers from merchants. Within this phase there are no confidential
events and hence,  differentiates between all the different incoming offers. Two states are only in relation  if they
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in secret offers (which are all offers not sent by ma). This consideration results in the following unwinding relation
for the customer:
Definition Ex-6 (Unwinding relation for customer). Let ca ∈ Ac be a customer and ma ∈ Am be a merchant. The
unwinding relation  for ca with respect to ma is defined by:
∀[Run,pc,mem], [Run′,pc′,mem′] ∈ Sca.
[Run′,pc′,mem′]  [Run,pc,mem] ⇐⇒
ψ(Run,pc) = ψ(Run′,pc′)∧
pc > 0 	⇒
(mem(RMers) = mem′(RMers)∧ mem(CurMer) = mem′(CurMer)
∧ (ma ∈ mem(OMers) ⇐⇒ ma ∈ mem′(OMers))
∧∀o ∈ Offers :
(ma, o) = min(mem′(Offers)) 	⇒ (ma, o) = min(mem(Offers))
∧ (min(mem′(Offers))min(mem(Offers))))
with ψ(⊥,0) = ψ(⊥,1) = 1, ψ(,1) = ψ(,2) = 2, ψ(,3) = 3, ψ(,4) = 4, ψ(,5) = ψ(,6) = ψ(,7) = 5.
5.1.2. Comparison-shopping scenario: unwinding relation for merchant agents
We are left with the speculation of an appropriate unwinding relation for a merchant ma′. In this case all information
about offers, requests, and contracts concerning our friend ca are confidential. Thus we basically identify (with respect
to ) all states which are equal if we ignore this confidential information. Formally we describe the unwinding relation
for the merchant ma′ as follows.
Definition Ex-7 (Unwinding relation for merchant). Let ma′ ∈ Am be a merchant and ca ∈ Ac be a customer. The
unwinding relation  for BSD of ma′ with respect to ca is defined by:
∀[Run,pc,mem], [Run′,pc′,mem′] ∈ Sma′
[Run′,pc′,mem′]  [Run,pc,mem] ⇐⇒
pc = pc′ ∧ Run = Run′∧
del(ca,mem(Requests)) = del(ca,mem′(Requests))∧
del(ca,mem(Offers)) = del(ca,mem′(Offers))∧
del(ca,mem(Contracts)) = del(ca,mem′(Contracts))
where del(ca, x) removes all tuples of the form (ca, x) from a set.
5.2. Verifying unwinding conditions and the entire multi-agent system
Finally, we verify the unwinding conditions for each instantiation with the view and the unwinding relation for a
friend in the following lemmas.
Lemma Ex-8. Let ca ∈ Ac be a customer, ma ∈ Am be a merchant, and  be the unwinding relation for ca with
respect to ma. Then, lrfVcama,ca holds for  and Tca.
Lemma Ex-9. Let ca ∈Ac be a customer, ma ∈Am be a merchant and  be unwinding relation for ca with respect
to ma. Then, oscVcama,ca holds for  and Tca.
Lemma Ex-10. Let ma′,ma ∈Am be two different merchants, ca ∈Ac be a customer and  the unwinding relation
for BSD of ma′ with respect to ca. Then, lrfVma′ma,ca holds for  and Tma′ .
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for BSD of ma′ with respect to ca. Then, oscVma′ma,ca holds for  and Tma′ .
The proofs of these lemmata can be found in Appendix A.
As a direct consequence of Theorem 23 and the preceding four Lemmas Ex-8, Ex-9, Ex-10, and Ex-11, we con-
clude:
Theorem Ex-12. BSDVcama,ca(Trca) and BSDVma′ma,ca(Trma′) for ma
′ = ma holds.
Given the result of Theorem Ex-12 we have verified that BSD holds for the customer ca and arbitrary merchants ma′
who are not identical to the observer ma. Since all friends satisfy BSD, and the family of views is C-preserving (as
shown at the end of Section 4) we conclude that the system ESΦ+ of friends satisfy BSD (according to Lemma 19).
Therefore, also the overall system satisfies BSD (according to Lemma 16). Hence, the system as specified in Section 2
satisfies the global security property as described in Section 3 by combining the results for the local security properties
of the individual friends with the results from the decomposition methodology.
Theorem Ex-13 (Security of the virtual mall). The virtual mall ESCS+ (as specified in Definition Ex-3) satisfies
confidentiality of offers (as specified in Definition Ex-4).
Note that we have chosen the security requirement confidentiality of offers as an example for illustrating our
approach to the security analysis of multi-agent systems. By no means do we intend to imply with this choice that this
requirement captured security of the virtual mall completely, i.e., there are other requirements that are relevant in our
virtual mall (see the examples given in the introduction), nor that it were universal, i.e., one can easily imagine virtual
malls where this requirement does not apply. Our case study can be used as a guideline when analyzing other security
requirement as one of the authors illustrated in [39].
We indicated definitions and lemmata that are specific for our case study of comparison shopping by labeling them
with Ex−. Changing the case study would result in a change of exactly these parts of our work: First, all participating
agents have to be specified with the help of PP-statements. Second, security requirements have to be formulated in
terms of basic security predicates. Third, in order to apply the decomposition method the set of agents has to be
divided into friends and observers such that the family of views of all friends is C-preserving. Finally, the unwinding
relations of the friends have to be specified and verified.
5.3. Towards a mechanization of the verification task
In this paragraph we will sketch aspects of automating the verification of unwinding conditions. First, we discuss
the translation of the problem specification (consisting of PP-statements, the unwinding relation and the corresponding
unwinding condition) into a (first-order) logic. Second, we propose some general tactics guiding a tactical theorem
prover in verifying or at least in simplifying the proposed unwinding conditions. These tactics arise on the one hand
from doing these proofs (like the proofs of Lemmas Ex-8, Ex-9, Ex-10, and Ex-11 shown in Appendix A) by hand
and extracting their regularities into common tactics and on the other hand from carrying forward existing tactics
developed for the verification of invariants of state-transition systems [17]. However, we would like to emphasize that
this process of refining and evaluating the tactics is still under development and lies outside the scope of this paper.
The formalization of the lemmata require the logical representations of the transition relation of the agent (including
the operations used within the transition table, like for instance ∈, select, or \), the reachability property, and the
unwinding relation. As mentioned in Section 2, PP-statements can be translated into first-order formulas together with
appropriate induction schemes. For instance [30] presents a translation of PP-statements into the input language of
the Verification Support Environment System VSE which supports first-order logic with induction. Reachability is a
recursively defined predicate based on the definition of the transition table. Finally, the unwinding relations as given
in this section are again first-order formulas. This allows us to formulate the proof obligations in a first-order language
enriched with means to specify generated algebraic data-types. The idea is to feed these problems into an inductive
theorem prover to obtain considerable support for verification. However, due to the size and complexity of the arising
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we therefore have to provide appropriate tactics to guide the proof. The proofs of the unwinding conditions follow
a regular pattern that can be used to formulate corresponding tactics. In the following we will sketch such common
proof patterns when verifying lrf .
∀[v1, . . . , vn], [v′1, . . . , v′n] ∈ S.∀c ∈ C.[(reachable(SES, s)∧ T ([v1, . . . , vn], c, [v′1, . . . , v′n])) ⇒ [v′1, . . . , v′n]  [v1, . . . , vn]].
The first step in such proofs is usually a case analysis on c ∈ C. In each case we unfold the definition of T which
results in formulas relating v1, . . . , vn to v′1, . . . , v′n. For instance, for all variables vi which are not mentioned in the
affects-slot we know that v′i = vi holds. In many other cases the post-conditions specify that v′i = f (v1, . . . , vn) for
some function f . Hence, we can rewrite the occurrences of most primed variables by terms containing only non-
primed variables and try to unfold non-recursive definitions. Doing such preprocessing in this case study would result
in proof obligations that are instances of inductive properties of finite-multi-set operations. A typical example is that
an element of the set of offers is still in the offers if we add a new offer. Inductive theorem proving techniques in
general [2] and generalization techniques (also presented in [2]) in particular might help to tackle these remaining
inductive problems.
Verifying osc is far more difficult since we have to prove an existentially quantified formula:
∀s1, s2, s′1 ∈ S ∀e ∈ E \C .
(reachable(SES, s1)∧ reachable(SES, s′1)∧ s1  s′1 ∧ T (s1, e, s2)) ⇒∃s′2 ∈ S ∃δ ∈ (E \C)∗ . (T (s′1, δ, s′2)∧ δ|V = 〈e〉|V ∧ s2  s′2).
Typically, the first step is a case analysis on e ∈ E \C which allows us to unfold the definition of T (s1, e, s2). The next
step is the speculation of an appropriate instance of δ. The selection of δ depends on the value of pc which causes an
additional case analysis on possible values of pc. In our case study, δ could be selected by inspecting the values of pc
since each event is unique with respect to the pre- and postconditions on pc (and Run). Once δ is fixed, we could unfold
the definition of T using the PP-statements and use (analogous to the proof of lrf ) the resulting equations v′i = f (. . .)
to demodulate the theorem. In our case study, we would be left with general inductive properties of functions used in
this case study. Obviously, the success of these tactics depends on the way PP-statements are formulated. In our case
study, postconditions of the form v′i = f (. . .) (v′i does not occur in f (. . .)) would allow us to simplify the theorem by
rewriting.
Analyzing the (human) proofs of the unwinding conditions revealed regularities which could be utilized for guiding
a tactical theorem prover. This is a first step towards the mechanization of verifying unwinding conditions which
constitutes a major burden when proving the security of the multi-agent system.
6. Related work
Several approaches to securing multi-agent systems against various threats have been presented in the literature.
However, most of these approaches focus on proposing concrete mechanisms for protecting agents and platforms
instead of implementing and verifying more abstract, mechanism-independent formal security policies as we have
done it in this article. Research on concrete security mechanisms for multi-agent systems can be divided into two
different categories, firstly the protection of the platform from malicious agents and secondly the protection of agents
from a malicious platform. Some approaches, however, have components which can be used for protection in both
directions.
An example for protection of the platform against agents is Signed Code, Verified Code or Proof Carrying Code
(PCC) [28,31]. The code of an agent is equipped with a certificate of its owner or a proof that the code does not exhibit
malicious behavior in order to enhance the trust in the code to be executed. Safe Interpreters and Sandboxing [28]
are approaches in which the platform executes the code of each agent in a separate environment such that the effect
of critical operations can be restricted. In the authentication and state appraisal technique [7] the agent is checked
before its execution in order to determine which resources should be granted by the platform and to detect potential
modifications of the code.
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to the agent’s code and control state in order to execute it. One idea is to attach (cryptographic) information about
the execution to the agent such that potential tampering of a malicious platform can be detected afterwards [26,44,
46]. Other approaches aim at obfuscating the agent’s code [14] or computing encrypted functions [41] such that the
platform cannot find out what the agent is supposed to do and thus cannot manipulate it on purpose. For a more
detailed review of general security mechanisms for multi-agent systems the reader is referred to [37].
Halpern and O’Neill [11,12] define various notions of secrecy for multi-agent systems by employing modal logic.
Like ours, their definitions are counterfactual ones: there is no information flow from Aj to Ai if all states of Aj are
compatible with all states of Ai . Similar less restrictive properties are defined and compared. Also, a modal logic is
introduced such that the semantic definition of secrecy corresponds to the validity of a set of formulas in the logic—
each one representing the proposition ‘agent Ai does not know φ’ for all φ from a semantically characterized set of
formulas. Halpern and O’Neill deal with the specification of secrecy and the relationship between different definitions.
However, they are not concerned with explicit ways to verify that an multi-agent system actually satisfies a concrete
definition of secrecy. Also, techniques for modular reasoning about secrecy and for decomposing secrecy requirements
are not addressed.
Subrahmanian et al. [36] develop a notion of confidentiality for heterogeneous agent systems in terms of violated
secrets. A secret fact is deemed violated if an observer knows it after communicating with an agent but did not
know it before. What each observer knows, i.e. can deduce from the communications with agents, is modeled using
a consequence relation, and thus the strength of the notion of confidentiality can be adjusted by choosing a weak
or strong consequence relation. On the other hand, the relevant channels over which secrets could be leaked in a
given system need to be encoded faithfully into the observer’s consequence relation. The authors note that this is
difficult in practice and provide a technique to safely approximate the set of secrets known to the observer. The
technique classifies all facts that are not causally related to an communication between agent and observer as violated
erroneously. It is thus necessary to determine whether there is a causal relationship between communication and secret
for the approximation techniques to be applicable. Since the notion of violated secrets is a property of one agent no
decomposition of the property is necessary.
7. Conclusions
This article has proposed a methodology to decompose security requirements for a multi-agent system into local
security requirements for individual agents and to use unwinding techniques to verify that an agent’s specification
satisfies these requirements. Although we developed this methodology within the implementation of the presented case
study in the first place, we feel confident that this methodology is also applicable to other scenarios. Modeling agents
and platform as (infinite) state-event systems allows us to model various programming paradigms for agents. The
decomposition methodology can be extended to cope with other basic security predicates or to cope with other ways
of message passing between agents [38]. Ref. [16], for instance, illustrates how to incorporate the use of encrypted
messages into the underlying framework.
The second contribution of this paper is the case study on comparison shopping. In [37] we investigated the security
of various versions of comparison shopping. We used one of these versions to instantiate and illustrate our decom-
position methodology: first, we specify customer and merchants using a first-order logic. Given the global security
requirement of the multi-agent system we decompose the set of agents into friends and observers which allows us to
formulate sufficient local security requirements for friends. Using unwinding techniques we prove that the specifica-
tion of the agents guarantees the corresponding unwinding relations. The invention of appropriate unwinding relations
is an error-prone task. Inspection of failed proofs typically reveals information on how to modify the unwinding rela-
tion. Since changes in the specification invalidates the proofs already done, an efficient change management (cf. [40])
is indispensable for maintaining open proof problems and adjusting old invalidated proofs to the new settings.
The investigation of further security requirements in the example scenario has revealed a need for a treatment of
declassification. Buy-requests necessarily reveal some information about a secret (for instance, the customer’s budget)
to the merchant and, hence, they constitute a declassification operation. In the presence of declassification, one can
capture requirements with so called intransitive policies and with information flow properties that can deal with such
policies. An extension of MAKS provides these capabilities [20], but in order to extend our analysis method to these
information flow properties, we will have to develop corresponding compositionality results first.
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Appendix A. Proofs of the unwinding conditions
Proof of Lemma Ex-8. (By case analysis on Ccama,ca.) Let s, s′ ∈ Sca, s reachable and Tca(s, c, s′).
• c = recvca(ma′,o) for ma′ = ma and o ∈ Offers: According to the corresponding PP-statement, we know that
mem(RMers) = mem′(RMers) and mem(CurMer) = mem′(CurMer).
Since mem′(OMers) = mem(OMers) \ {ma′}, also (ma ∈ mem(OMers) ⇐⇒ ma ∈ mem′(OMers)) holds.
min(mem′(Offers)) = min({(ma′, o)} ∪ mem(Offers))  min(mem(Offers)). Also, (ma, o) = min(mem′(Offers))
and ma = ma′ implies (ma, o) = min(mem(Offers)). Furthermore, Run = Run′ and pc = pc′ so that s′  s holds.
• c = sendca(ma′,buy(o)) for ma′ = ma and o ∈ Offers: c does neither change OMers, RMers, Offers nor CurMer.
Since also ψ(,6) = ψ(,7) holds, s′  s holds trivially. 
Proof of Lemma Ex-9. Let s1, s′1, s2 ∈ Sca with reachable(SESca, s1), Tca(s1, e, s2), reachable(SESca, s′1), and s1 
s′1. We prove this lemma by case analysis on all events e ∈ V cama,ca ∪Ncama,ca that are enabled in s1:
• e = initca(initvals):
since ψ(Runs1,pcs1) = ψ(Runs′1 ,pcs′1) we know that pcs′1  1 and Runs′1 = ⊥. If pcs′1 = 0 then let δ =〈initca(initvals)〉 and δ = 〈〉 otherwise. Since initvals determines the initial values of RMers, OMers, Offers and
CurMer, the init-event causes the same initializations of these variables in both cases and thus s2  s′2 holds.• e = startca:
again, we know that pcs′1  1 and Runs′1 = ⊥. If pcs′1 = 0 then δ = 〈initca(initvals),startca〉 and otherwise δ =〈startca〉.
• e = intca(1,2,mem):
thus mems′1(RMers) = mems1(RMers) = mems2(RMers). If pcs′1 = 1 we choose δ = 〈intca(1,2,mem)〉 which re-
sults in mems2(CurMer) = mems′2(CurMer) and pcs2 = 2 = pcs′2 . Hence s2  s′2.Suppose, pcs′1 = 2. Then, δ = 〈〉. Since pcs′1 = 2 holds, the last event which could have happened was
intca(1,2,mem) that causes the situation mems′1(CurMer) = select(mems′1(RMers)). Therefore, mems′2(CurMer) =
mems′1(CurMer) = select(mems′1(RMers)) = select(mems1(RMers)) = mems2(CurMer). Furthermore, we know
that Offers, RMers and OMers are unchanged by these events and ψ(Runs2,pcs2) = ψ(Runs1,pcs1)= ψ(Runs′1 ,pcs′1) = ψ(Runs′2 ,pcs′2). Thus s2  s′2 holds.• e = intca(2,3,mem):
thus pcs′1 ∈ {1,2}. If pcs′1 = 1 we choose δ = 〈intca(1,2,mem), intca(2,3,mem)〉. select(mems′1(RMers)) =
select(mems1(RMers)) = mems1(CurMer) holds since intca(1,2,mem) is the only event to reach pc = 2.
Therefore, mems′2(CurMer) = mems2(CurMer) and mems′2(RMers) = mems′1(RMers) \ select(mems′1(RMers)) =
mems1(RMers) \ select(mems1(RMers)) = mems2(RMers). Suppose pcs′1 = 2. We choose δ = 〈intca(2,3,mem)〉
and s2  s′2 holds obviously.• e = sendca(ma,offer_request(p)):
thus pcs′1 = 3 and e is enabled in s′1. We choose δ = 〈sendca(ma,offer_request(p))〉. Since pcs2 = pcs′2 = 4 and
therefore ψ(Runs2,pcs2) = ψ(Runs′2 ,pcs′2) holds, we deduce s2  s′2.• e = intca(1,4,mem):
thus pcs1 = 1 and mems1(RMers) = nil. Therefore, mems′1(RMers) = nil and pcs′1 = 1 (since intca(1,2,mem) is
not enabled on empty merchant sets). Thus, e is enabled in s′1 and we choose δ = 〈intca(1,4,mem)〉 resulting
trivially in s2  s′2.• e = recvca(ma, o):
thus pcs′1 = 4 and e is enabled in s′1. With δ = 〈recvca(ma, o)〉,
mems′ (OMers) = mems′ (OMers) \ {ma} = mems (OMers) \ {ma} = mems (OMers).2 1 1 2
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(ma, o′) = min(mems′1(Offers)). Hence, (ma, o) = min({(ma, o)} ∪ mems1(Offers)) implies (ma, o) =
min({(ma, o)} ∪ mems′1(Offers)) and therefore (ma, o) = min(mems2(Offers)) = min(mems′2(Offers)).
min(mems1(Offers)) = min(mems2(Offers))  min({(ma, o)} ∪ mems′1(Offers)) = min(mems′2(Offers)). Also
min(mems2(Offers))  min(mems′2(Offers)) holds because either (ma, o) = min(mems2(Offers)) =
min(mems′2(Offers)) or there is a (ma′, o′) with (ma′, o′) = min(mems2(Offers)) = min({(ma, o)}∪mems1(Offers))min({(ma, o)} ∪ mems′1(Offers)).
Finally ψ(Runs′2 ,pcs′2) = ψ(,4) = ψ(Runs2,pcs2) which results in s2  s′2.• e = intca(4,5,mem):
thus pcs′1 = 4 and e is enabled in s′1. We choose δ = 〈intca(4,5,mem)〉 and s2  s′2 holds trivially.• e = intca(5,6,mem) does not change any local variables of the unwinding relations. Choosing δ = 〈〉, s2  s′2
holds trivially.
• e = sendca(ma,buy(o)) does not change any local variables of the unwinding relations. Depending on pc′ = 5
or pc′ = 6 we choose δ = 〈sendca(ma,buy(o))〉 or δ = 〈intca(5,6,mem), sendca(ma,buy(o))〉 respectively. Since
(ma, o) = min({(ma, o)}∪mems1(Offers)) implies (ma, o) = min({(ma, o)}∪mems′1(Offers)) the e is also enabled
in the state following s′1 after executing intca(5,6,mem) and s2  s′2 holds. 
Proof of Lemma Ex-10. (By case analysis on Cma′ma,ca.) Let s, s′ ∈ Sma′ , s reachable and Tma′(s, c, s′).
• c = recvma′(ca,buy(o)):
pc = pc′, Run = Run′ and del(ca,mem′(Requests)) = del(ca,mem(Requests)) hold trivially. Since
del(ca,mem′(Offers)) = del(ca,mem(Offers) \ {(ca,o)}) = del(ca,mem(Offers))
and also del(ca,mem′(Contracts)) = del(ca, {(ca,o)} ∪ mem(Contracts)) = del(ca,mem(Contracts)), we know
that s′  s holds.
• c = sendma(ca,o):
pc = pc′, Run = Run′, and del(ca,mem′(Contracts)) = del(ca,mem(Contracts)) hold trivially. Since
del(ca,mem′(Offers)) = del(ca, {(ca,o)} ∪ mem(Offers)) = del(ca,mem(Offers))
and also del(ca,mem′(Requests)) = del(ca,mem(Requests) \ {(ca,p)}) = del(ca,mem(Requests)), we know that
s′  s holds. 
Proof of Lemma Ex-11. Let s1, s′1, s2 ∈ Sma′ with reachable(SESma′ , s1), s1  s′1, reachable(SESma′ , s′1), and
Tma′(s1, e, s2). We prove this lemma by case analysis on all events e ∈ V ma′ma,ca ∪Nma′ma,ca that are enabled in s1:
• e = initma′(initvals):
since pcs1 = pcs′1 = 0, e is enabled in s′1 and we choose δ = 〈initma′(initvals)〉. Thus, pcs2 = pcs′2 = 1 and Runs2 =
Runs′2 =  but also mems2 = mems′2 , since applying the same init-event will result in same initializations of mem.
Thus, s2  s′2 holds.• e = startma′ :
we know that pcs′1 = pcs1 = 1 and Runs′1 = Runs1 = ⊥. Hence, e is enabled in s′1 and we choose δ = 〈startma′ 〉.
Since mems′2 = mems′1 and mems2 = mems1 , s2  s′2 holds.• e = recvma′(ca′,offer_request(p)), e = recvma′(ca′,buy(o)), or e = sendma′(ca′,o) with ca = ca′: In all these
events pc and Run do not change. s1  s′1 guarantees that the values of Requests, Offers, and Contracts in s1 and
s′1 agree on all tuples concerning customers ca′ = ca. For such customers we choose δ = 〈e〉 which guarantees that
again the values of Requests, Offers, and Contracts agree on all tuples concerning customers ca′ = ca. Therefore,
s2  s
′
2 holds.• We are left with e = recvma′(ca,offer_request(p)): In this case we choose δ = 〈〉 and s2  s′2 holds obviously. 
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